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A

Abstract

pple’s victory against Samsung in 2012 reaffirms the power of patents and the
extent to which they drive profits in the technology sector.1 It also highlights the
fact that the precise contribution of intellectual property (“IP”) to firm value is
a matter of perspective. Technology companies must value IP every time they engage in
M&A activity, intercompany technology licensing, or tax-motivated IP migration. Significant
methodological differences in each area create potential pitfalls for firms and practitioners in
an increasingly skeptical investor and regulatory environment.
The profusion of IP litigation presents an additional challenge to technology companies.
Expert witnesses and technology-savvy jurors can reach widely divergent conclusions
regarding IP value. Moreover, those valuations are likely to differ substantially from results
reached in the course of purchase price allocation and transfer pricing studies. Careful
management of the preparation and dissemination of these analyses may allow firms to avoid
costly misinterpretations of the results.

Introduction

A

pple’s 2012 victory against
Samsung reaffirms the value of
patents and the extent to which
they drive profits in the technology sector.
It also highlights the fact that the precise
contribution of intellectual property (“IP”)
to firm value is not easily measurable. In
Apple v. Samsung, Apple’s experts estimated
that the company losses were in excess of
1

$2.5 billion as a result of Samsung’s patent
infringement. Samsung’s experts countered
with a figure closer to $520 million. The
jury awarded $1.05 billion. Which of these
calculations, if any, approximates the true
value of the infringed patents?
Questions about IP value extend well
beyond the courtroom. Technology companies
are faced with these questions every time they
engage in merger and acquisition (“M&A”)
activity, intercompany

Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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technology licensing, or tax-motivated IP
migration. Global technology firms often
pursue these strategies simultaneously and,
because valuation results are highly sensitive
to their analytical context, companies may
find themselves in the uncomfortable position
of defending very different assessments of
the value of their technology. Understanding
accepted methodologies and their respective
and comparative impact on estimates of IP
value can facilitate a coordinated approach
to these analyses.
Well-reasoned and
supported IP valuations may also avoid costly
proceedings with courts, financial regulators
and tax authorities.

The Challenge of IP Valuation
IP drives enterprise value in technologybased economies. Unprotected sources of
competitive advantage – know-how, processes
and talent, to name a few - dissipate quickly
in markets “turbo-charged” by immediate and
continuous access to information. It’s no
surprise, then, to see companies like Apple
vigorously defend their IP when they believe it
has been unlawfully appropriated. As a result
IP claims continue to escalate, with litigants
expending enormous resources to quantify
the value of the disputed IP.
Even absent litigation, companies pay
close attention to IP, continuously searching
for new ways to extract value from existing
IP and hunting for sources of valuable new
technology. Google’s 2012 $12.5 billion
acquisition of Motorola Mobility was part of
a specific strategy to expand the market for
its Android operating system and protect its
smartphone manufacturing partners.
IP exploitation enhances shareholder
value by generating competitive advantages
that result in higher profits. Firms devote
substantial resources to research and
development (“R&D”) activity, aggressively
pursue IP through M&A, or employ a
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sjsumstjournal/vol3/iss1/7
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combination of both strategies. In addition,
companies may extract additional benefits
from IP, either by deploying it simultaneously
in several locations worldwide or by structuring
and/or migrating R&D activities to reduce
income tax liability.
In the case of M&A, U.S. and
international regulations require that the
acquiring entity report the value of the IP it has
purchased in order to promote transactional
transparency. If the company is migrating
R&D activity or licensing the resulting IP to its
cross-border affiliates, tax authorities require
an IP valuation analysis in order to ensure
compliance with the arm’s length standard
and associated transfer pricing regulations.
Financial reporting and transfer pricing
documentation requirements are not new;
most companies are familiar with the accepted
approaches to IP valuation for business
combination studies and intercompany pricing
analyses. Valuation and transfer pricing

Well-reasoned and supported IP
valuations may also avoid costly
proceedings with courts, financial
regulators and tax authorities.

practitioners are aware of the differences in
these approaches and the need to coordinate
the respective analyses, especially when
they involve exchanges of the same or similar
technology at roughly the same time.
But the recent increase in IP litigation
involving the biggest names in the technology
sector presents an additional challenge to
technology companies. Expert witnesses
and technology-savvy jurors can reach widely
divergent conclusions regarding IP value.1
1
The Apple versus Samsung jury “ignored paid
experts” and calculated the damage award itself. (2012,
August 27). “Apple Victory Shifts Power Balance.” The Wall

Moreover, those valuations are likely to differ
substantially from results reached in the course
of purchase price allocation and transfer
pricing studies, compounding the confusion.
In an increasingly skeptical investor and
regulatory environment, companies can ill
afford suspicions that they have manipulated
courts, investors or regulators, by proposing
different valuations of IP to suit their purposes
in each area.
Even absent direct involvement
in IP litigation, technology companies
should anticipate more challenges to their
intercompany royalty studies and purchase
price allocation analyses as information from
high-profile litigation becomes public. The
fact that significant differences exist across
accepted methodologies in each area creates
potential pitfalls for firms and practitioners
alike.
Understanding these differences will
not only allow firms to anticipate and respond
to challenges, but may encourage a more
coherent approach to IP valuation in the first
place.2

Reasonable Royalty Approach
The U.S. Patent Act allows a prevailing
plaintiff in a patent infringement suit to recover
compensatory damages for the economic
harm caused by the infringer.3 Ideally, a
Street Journal, p. A1. (2012, August 25). Elmer-DeWitt,
Philip. “Apple v. Samsung: Meet the Foreman of the Jury.”
Retrieved from http//www.fortune.cnn.com. Occasionally,
the difference between the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s expert
valuation is so extreme and the analyses so complex, that
the court or jury is suspected of “splitting the difference” in
awarding damages.
2
For ease of discussion, IP valuation for financial
reporting purposes will hereinafter be referred to as
“financial valuation” or the “financial reporting approach,”
while IP valuation for intercompany pricing purposes will
be referred to as “transfer pricing valuation” or the “transfer
pricing approach.”
3
U.S. Patent Act (2012), 35 USC §284 (1952).
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damage award is based upon a determination
of profits lost to the plaintiff as a result of the
infringement. However, in cases where lost
profits cannot be determined, either because
the claimant has not lost sales to the infringer
or because the calculation of lost profits is
considered too speculative, the courts will
accept a royalty analysis. In fact, even if lost
profits can be determined, the Patent Act
requires that, at a minimum, damages should
reflect a “reasonable royalty” for use of the IP
by the infringer.
The reasonable royalty approach
posits a hypothetical negotiation between
a willing licensor (the plaintiff) and licensee
(the alleged infringer). The negotiation is
assumed to take place on the date of first
infringement. While the term “reasonable
royalty” has no economic meaning, in order
to be acceptable to both parties it must leave
each better off than had it pursued other
available alternatives. In the case of the
alleged infringer, these alternatives include
the possibility of designing around the
patent to achieve comparable functionality
without infringement. In cases where such
a non-infringing alternative is feasible, the
reasonable royalty cannot be higher than
the design-around cost. Assessment of any
alternatives yields a range bounded by the
minimum acceptable royalty for the licensor
and the maximum acceptable royalty to the
licensee.
Typically, the courts accept a royalty
analysis based on the IP-related profits
anticipated by the infringer at the time of
the hypothetical negotiation. In general, the
royalty leaves the infringer with a portion of
these intangible profits.4 The argument is that
Retrieved from http://www.uspto.gov
4
The courts may accept royalty rates on the high end
of the range in cases of willful infringement, which was the
principal finding in Apple v. Samsung. In addition, while
the hypothetical negotiation is assumed to take place on
the date of first infringement, courts sometimes consider
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the hypothetical licensee would not agree
to a royalty that did not allow it to earn a
“reasonable” profit; economics dictates that
the licensee would be willing to accept any
royalty that results in higher profits than the
next best alternative.

would the cost of any asset and allocates the
price to the tangible, financial and intangible
assets acquired. Assets must be recognized
at fair value, defined as the price at which an
asset could be bought or sold in a current
transaction between market participants.7

Financial Reporting Approach5

ASC 350 addresses how acquired
intangibles should be accounted for in
financial statements, both upon and following
their acquisition. It prohibits the amortization
of goodwill and some intangible assets,
where goodwill is defined as the excess of
the purchase price over the fair market value
of net assets. The value of any amortized
intangibles, those intangible assets that arise
from contractual or legal rights or are separable
from other assets, must be documented
and supported by financial analysis.8 ASC
805 and ASC 350 effectively require firms
to recognize and value intangible assets on

For financial statement reporting
purposes, an intangible asset is defined as one
that is identifiable, “lacks physical substance”
and is not a financial asset.6 As long as that
asset arises from legal or contractual rights, the
asset will be recognized apart from goodwill.
Intangible assets may be marketing-related,
customer-related, artistic-related, contractbased or technology-based; this category of
assets clearly includes patented technology.
When a U.S. firm makes an acquisition,
it must recognize the assets acquired and

The FASB accepts three general approaches to intangible asset
valuation: the market approach, the income approach and the
cost approach.
liabilities assumed, and adjust for any noncontrolling interest in the acquired entity.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) codified these requirements in ASC
805, which requires firms to use the purchase
method of accounting when reporting
business combinations. That is, the acquiring
firm records the price of the merger as it
subsequent information, especially if it supports a higher
royalty rate. In both cases, the court’s discretion is designed
to reinforce the punitive nature of the damages award.
5
The reporting requirements described here are
based on Financial Accounting Standards Board statements.
However, by design, they correspond closely to international
reporting requirements.
6
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
Business Combinations (revised 2007) Paragraph 3.
Retrieved from http://www.fasb.org
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an individual basis, in order to provide more
relevant and reliable information to investors.
Financial valuations begin with the
acquisition price and rely primarily on
discounted future cash flows and balance
sheet analysis. Any excess of the purchase
price over the fair value of tangible assets is
attributed to intangible assets and/or goodwill.
Intangible assets must then be identified and
their value separately derived. Any remaining
value is classified as goodwill.9
7
FASB.(2009). ASC 805 Business Combinations.
Retrieved from http://www.fasb.org
8
FASB.(2009). ASC 350 Goodwill Valuations for
Financial Reporting. Retrieved from http://www.fasb.org
9
If the sum of fair values of the assets exceeds the
acquisition price, the transaction is viewed as a “bargain
purchase” and the gain is recorded on the acquiring entity’s

The FASB accepts three general
approaches to intangible asset valuation: the
market approach, the income approach and
the cost approach. In the market approach,
intangible asset value is determined by
reference to similar assets that have been sold
or licensed. If such market transactions can be
identified, the terms of those transactions are
used to establish the value of the intangible
in question. Increasingly, analysts recognize
that IP - by its very nature - exhibits unique
characteristics and capabilities, and that the
probability of identifying truly comparable
sales or licenses is low.

unlikely to yield a correct estimate of value,
except in rare circumstances.

Absent reliable market evidence, the
intangible may be valued using the income
approach. A discounted cash flow model is
constructed, based on assumptions regarding
growth, profitability, competition, risk, and
asset life. The model then calculates the
present value of the stream of future profits
attributable to the intangible asset in question.

The financial valuation analysis relies
on balance sheet data, while a reasonable
royalty calculation typically relies on a profit
analysis. This difference in methodologies
should not result in different IP values; since
corporate assets generate cash flows through
time, an asset’s value is a stock measure of the
discounted cash flows the asset is expected
to create. The important distinction between
the two approaches is in their respective
starting points.

Under the income approach, an
intangible asset’s value is calculated over its
“useful life:” the period of time over which the
asset is expected to contribute to the reporting
entity’s (i.e. the buyer’s) cash flows. As long
as the asset is contributing or expected to
contribute to future cash flows, it will attract a
portion of the firm’s value. The useful life of
patented technology is typically viewed as the
remaining life of the patent.
Finally, the cost approach may be
used. This approach relies on the principle
of replacement cost to estimate asset value,
and is typically used to value intangible assets
such as engineering know-how or technical
drawings.
The cost approach implicitly
assumes that value is somehow tied to cost.
In fact, there is no economic link between the
development cost associated with a particular
technology and the value it ultimately
generates. A cost approach, therefore, is

Comparison of the Reasonable
Royalty and Financial Reporting
Approaches
If the market approach is used to value
IP in a financial reporting analysis, there is no
reason to believe that the determination of
value would differ from a reasonable royalty
approach using the same methodology. The
difficulty arises when the financial valuation
and the reasonable royalty calculation both
rely on the income approach.

The financial valuation is a “top-down”
analysis, in which the market value of the firm
is reflected in the acquisition cost. Although
the FASB has increased the focus on
individual intangible asset identification and
valuation, financial reporting analyses are
still intended to allocatethetotal acquisition
cost across a variety of candidate tangible

The financial valuation is a
“top-down” analysis, in which
the market value of the firm is
reflected in the acquisition cost

income statement.
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and intangible assets. The firm’s purchase
price often includes a premium over a value
calculated strictly on the basis of expected
future profits. This premium reflects a variety
of factors, including current stock market
conditions, anticipated synergies, majority
control and other benefits attributable to the
anticipated business combination. Arguably,
such a premium should be allocated entirely
to goodwill. In practice, however, some
portion of this premium may be attributed to
the firm’s IP.
The reasonable royalty approach, in
contrast, represents a purely “bottom-up”
analysis. The purpose of the exercise is to
determine the value of a particular piece of IP,
not of the entire firm. No premium value can
be allocated to the IP, because the market
value of the firm as a whole has not been
determined.
Which analysis correctly assesses
the value of the IP? Recall the definition
of economic value: it is derived from an

The reasonable royalty
approach represents a purely
“bottom-up” analysis….
because the market value of
the firm as a whole has not
been determined.

therefore, the purchase price may not reflect
the true economic value of the underlying
assets. Allocating that purchase price to
a firm’s individual intangible assets may
introduce “noise” into the asset valuation,
distorting economic value. The difficulty arises
because the analytical starting point is the
sale of an entire firm, rather than the licensing
of an individual asset, notwithstanding the
FASB’s focus on an asset-by-asset analysis.
Note that the FASB does not advocate
the allocation of a purchase price premium
to firm IP. Recent changes to business
combination accounting requirements were
intended to increase the focus on individual
intangible asset identification and valuation
and to increase transparency in the financial
reporting of acquisitions. To the extent that
distortions in estimates of IP value occur,
they result from firm incentives to attach as
much of the purchase price as possible to
intangible assets other than goodwill, since
goodwill cannot be amortized. Ironically, the
increased transparency required by the FASB
may increase firm incentives to overvalue
intangible assets.
How do these different approaches alter
the estimated value of patented technology?
If the purchase price includes a market-based
premium, the technology may be valued more
highly in a financial reporting analysis than in
a reasonable royalty calculation.

Transfer Pricing Approach
asset’s ability to generate income. Markets
are hypothetically efficient, and in theory
a firm’s market price should reflect the
economic value of its assets. However, the
market may experience a temporary shock,
or disequilibrium, causing the market value
of a public company to rise and fall from day
to day. Moreover, bidding wars can emerge
for private or public companies, with resulting
price spikes. At a particular point in time,

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sjsumstjournal/vol3/iss1/7
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For
transfer
pricing
purposes,
intangible asset valuation is required in a
variety of circumstances. Section 482 of the
Internal Revenue Code and the underlying
Regulations (commonly referred to as “the
U.S. transfer pricing regulations”) require that
all transfers of tangible and intangible property
within a multinational enterprise (MNE) take
place under terms that would prevail if the
transacting entities were unrelated. An MNE

that wishes to license its patented technology
to other related entities must determine an
arm’s-length royalty payment. The arm’slength analysis influences the portion of
worldwide income that is earned in each tax
jurisdiction, and consequently affects the
MNE’s global tax liability.10

prescribe three methods for determining an
arm’s-length price for the transfer of intangible
property.11 The regulations direct the taxpayer
to select the method that provides the most
reliable measure of an arm’s-length result.
Similar to the market approach in financial
valuation, the comparable uncontrolled
The U.S. transfer pricing regulations transaction (“CUT”) method may be used
define an intangible asset as one that “… if the MNE member licenses comparable
has substantial value independent of the intangible property to or from an unrelated
services of any individual…” and “derives party. The taxpayer can evaluate whether
its value not from its physical attributes but or not the intercompany exchange takes
from its intellectual content or other intangible place at arm’s length by reference to the
properties.” The regulations identify categories comparable uncontrolled transaction. Absent
of intangible property that closely resemble such market evidence, transfer pricing
regulations direct the MNE
those in the FASB
to profit-based methods,
statements. Implicit in
including the Comparable
In a transfer pricing
the prescribed transfer
Profits Method (“CPM”)
context… only a subset of
pricing
valuation
and the Profit Split Method
what constitutes intangible
methodologies,
(“PSM”).
The frequent
assets for financial reporting
however, is a focus on
lack of comparable market
purposes is at issue
non-routine intangibles,
evidence requires that
or those that allow
most analyses rely on
the company to earn
these latter methods.12
supranormal returns.
They begin with the
An intangible is considered valuable and
non-routine as long as it generates profits identification of routine functions performed
beyond those attributable to routine functions by the firm. Arm’s-length returns to these
(e.g., distribution and manufacturing). functions are determined by reference to
Profits associated with routine intangibles the profits of comparable independent firms.
are indistinguishable from returns to routine These routine profits are then subtracted
functions, and consequently cannot be from total operating profits and any residual
separately valued or transferred. In a transfer profits are attributed to the intangible(s). If
pricing context, therefore, only a subset of the purpose of the analysis is to determine
what constitutes intangible assets for financial an arm’s-length royalty rate, these residual
reporting purposes is at issue. Patented profits represent appropriate compensation
technology may or may not constitute a
valuable, non-routine intangible.
U.S.

transfer

pricing

regulations

10
Internal Revenue Service, Department of the
Treasury IRC §§1.482-1 through 1.482-8 . Retrieved
from http://www.irs.gov. The OECD’s Transfer Pricing
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises imposes nearly
identical requirements on firms with owned operations in
member countries.
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11
The discussion refers to Reg. §1.482-47. Reg.
§1.482-7 addresses intangible transfers in the context of a
cost sharing arrangement (CSA) between related parties.
Additional methods (income, acquisition price, and market
capitalization) may be applied to evaluate intangible asset
transactions pursuant to a CSA.
12
While the PSM can be applied based on evidence
from uncontrolled taxpayers, the arm’s length analysis
typically defaults to a residual profit split.
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to the owner of the intangible.

13

For transfer pricing purposes, the
relevant life of an intangible asset is considered
to be its “economic” life, or the period of time
over which the asset generates supranormal
profits. The asset’s economic life is shorter
than its useful life; its economic life ends
when it no longer generates non-routine
profits, while its useful life continues as long
as it generates profits for GAAP purposes.
On the surface, the transfer pricing
approach to IP valuation appears to closely
resemble the reasonable royalty approach.
The purpose of the exercise is to determine
the economic value of a particular non-routine
intangible, or piece of IP, not of the entire
firm. In addition, absent market evidence
(for comparable transactions or established
royalty rates), both approaches typically rely
on an estimate of future profits attributable to
the intangible, rather than a balance sheet
analysis. However, the two approaches can
generate significantly different results.
First, recall that the transfer pricing
analysis begins with operating profits,
and then removes profits attributable to
routine functions such as manufacturing
and distribution. The reasonable royalty
approach removes the costs associated
with manufacturing (e.g. depreciation, raw
materials, labor) and distribution (e.g. sales
and marketing expenses), but does not
explicitly remove a return to those costs. In
this respect, the IP value suggested by the
transfer pricing analysis is likely to be lower
than the value implied by a reasonable royalty
calculation.
Second, the transfer pricing analysis
relies upon a shorter “economic life” than
the useful life posited in both the financial
13
In the case of multiple affiliate contributors to
the development of valuable non-routine intangibles, the
residual profits will be allocated according the relative size
of the contributions.
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2013
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valuation and reasonable royalty approaches.
Assuming identical estimates of future profits
associated with the IP, the transfer pricing
analysis can generate a lower intangible
asset value than a financial valuation or a
reasonable royalty analysis.14
Third, the transfer pricing analysis
returns all of the excess profits attributable
to the IP to the intangible asset owner in the
form of a royalty. In contrast, the reasonable
royalty approach typically divides the value of
the IP between the licensor and licensee. This
difference will likely decrease the reasonable
royalty estimate relative to the transfer pricing
royalty.15
Finally, while the reasonable royalty
approach accounts for feasible non-infringing
alternatives available to the licensee, the
transfer pricing approach does not. This
difference will almost certainly drive the
reasonable royalty lower than the transfer
pricing royalty, since a reasonable royalty –
by definition - shouldn’t cost the hypothetical
licensor more than the cost of designing
around the patent.

Implications and Conclusions		
While tax authorities and practitioners
have expressly rejected court-determined
damages awards as arm’s length evidence
of intangible asset value for transfer pricing
purposes, companies should not assume
that the underlying expert analyses regarding
14
If the likelihood of rapid technological advance is
“built in” to the reasonable royalty calculation, its impact
on cash flows would be to reduce the expected infringer
profits attributable to the technology, thereby reducing
the treasonable royalty. This would offset the longer life
assumed in the calculation and lower the implied value of
the IP.
15
Only in rare cases will the profit division reflect
the division between routine returns and returns to nonroutine intangibles implicit in the transfer pricing analysis,
causing the two analyses to converge.

reasonable royalties can be entirely ignored.
Experts testify that these analyses represent
their best estimates of the value of intellectual
property under certain circumstances and at
a specific time. By definition, the litigants are
unrelated, so any hypothetical negotiation
would satisfy the arm’s length principle. To the
extent that these expert analyses or resulting
conclusions regarding reasonable royalties
are disseminated publicly, companies may
have to explain why their analyses of the
same IP for transfer pricing or financial
reporting purposes generate different results.
Unfortunately, the methodology differences
between the reasonable royalty, financial
reporting and transfer pricing approaches
don’t allow for straightforward conclusions as
to which approach will generate the highest
or lowest estimates of IP value.
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In the meantime, what are the
implications of disparate valuation analyses?
First, litigants may try to introduce either
financial or transfer pricing IP valuations
in an effort to discredit their adversaries,
and/or as evidence of the firm’s “true”
view of the value of the disputed patent.16
Second, investors, financial regulators or tax
authorities may examine the litigation history
of the firm and attempt to use accessible
information regarding reasonable royalty
analyses as evidence of IP value in a tax or
financial context. A coordinated approach
to IP analysis can reduce inconsistencies,
but cannot eliminate them. To the extent
that firms and practitioners can manage the
preparation, dissemination and clarification
of these analyses, they may avoid costly
misinterpretations of the results.
----------16
While these analyses are typically protected by
attorney-client privilege, relationships in the technology
world are complex. For example, in spite of the recent
case and ongoing litigation worldwide, Apple continues to
purchase components from Samsung.
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